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INTRODUCTION
Anurban housing market is a network of interrelated
parts. The decision to tear down a block of houses in one
neighborhood forces the occupants to seek housing else-
where and sets in motion a chain of moves that can affect communi-
ties throughout an area. The decision to restrict growth in a suburban
area has similar far-flung effects, stimulating new construction in
other suburbs and perhaps stimulating redevelopment of older
housing aswell. A decision to pay housing allowances to the
low-income households of an urban area may decrease the demand
for the lowest-quality stock, increase the demand for somewhat
better housing, and could eventually produce changes in the entire
structure of housing prices and locational patterns of the area.
The housing market is, of course, not unique in being composed of
many interrelated parts. It is true of housing, however, that many
policy controversies have centered to an unusual extent on exactly
how this network of interrelations works—on the relocation effects
of urban renewal, on the price effects of housing allowances, on the
population redistribution caused by local no-growth policies. A
model capable of analyzing these issues must deal in some detail with
Note: Sue Marshall, Larry Ozanne, and Ann Schnare worked with us on the
model and share full credit for the results reported here. Dennis Eisen and
Andrew Struik also made important contributions to the model. The entire
project was sponsored by the Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development. We, however, bear full
responsibility for statements made and views expressed.
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submarkets for different levels of housing quality and different
geographic locations.
Besides dealing with submarkets and their interrelations, a realistic
housing model must reflect two special characteristics accounting for
much of the distinctive behavior of housing markets: "durability"
and "neighborhood effects." Durability of housing refers not only to
the long time period over which the housing stock yields its services
but also to the unalterable nature of many of the characteristics of a
dwelling once it is built. Whether a dwelling is a detached house or an
apartment in a twenty-story building, whether it is downtown or in a
suburb, whether it is on a large or a small lot—these are among the
many characteristics largely fixed at the time of construction. The
second feature of housing markets—neighborhood effects—refers not
just to the dependence of the value of one dwelling upon the
physical appearance of neighboring dwellings but, even more impor-
tant, to the strong influence of neighborhood racial composition and
socioeconomic status on the choice of where to live.
The Urban Institute housing model is an attempt to quantify the
interrelationships among the parts of an urban housing market while
emphasizing the two special characteristics of durability and neigh-
borhood effects. It represents an urban housing market composed of
thirty to forty "model" dwellings and households, a new-construc-
tion industry, and numerous possibilities for government interven-
tion. Households choose which dwelling to occupy on the basis of
the utility function, while owners of existing dwellings choose levels
of housing services they will provide on the basis of expected profit
maximization. Durability enters the model through the distinction
between new housing, which is assumed to be perfectly elastic in
supply, and existing dwellings, whose specific characteristics are
among the initialconditions of the model and whose supply
elasticity is one of the principle objects of empirical investigation.
Neighborhood effectsare captured by having each household's
decision to occupy or not to occupy a particular dwelling depend not
only on the characteristics and price of that dwelling but also on
characteristics of other dwellings and occupants in the geographic
zone in which that dwelling is located.
Development of the model has been under the sponsorship of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. HUD's particular
interest in sponsoring the model has been the analysis of the possible
effects of housing allowances, but the model has been designed so
that a variety of housing policies and other economic or demographic
developments can be analyzed within the same framework. Work on
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primarilyto developing the theoretical model and a procedure for its
computer simulation. The second year of work emphasized empirical
applications to U.S. metropolitan areas during 1960-1970. Initial
empirical work led to some changes in the structure of the model and
in the computer algorithm simulation procedure. The most recent
period has been taken up with these changes plus additional empiri-
cal work and the beginnings of policy analysis.
The remainder of this study is in three parts. We describe the
model, beginning with a nontechnical account of the general struc-
ture, then proceed to a mathematical description of the key relation-
ships; and summarize the empirical results of applications to six
metropolitan areas. We deal with model results, first introducing the
useful analytical device of a price-structure curve and then describing
results of simulating a rise in new-construction costs, a slowdown of
population growth, and two housing policies. In the final section, we
appraise some of the strong and weak points of the model.
MODELDESCRIPTION
The Theoretical Model in Brief
TheUrban Institute housing model deals with ten-year changes in
housing quality and household location within a metropolitan area.
The four key phrases of this capsule description are "ten-year
changes," "housing quality," "household location," and "within a
metropolitan area." Each of them serves to distinguish the model
from other models or studies, for example, from short-run explana-
tions of housing market dynamics, from location-free theories of the
filtering process, or from macroeconomic analyses with a national
focus.
As mentioned earlier, a metropolitan housing market is repre-
sented in the model by a few dozen "model" households, a few
dozen "model" dwellings, a building industry, and possibilities for a
variety of government restrictions or programs. The four "actors" in
the model are, therefore, households seeking a place to live, owners
of existing dwellings offering housing services at various prices, a
building industry meeting demands at an acceptable rate of return,
and governments able to regulate the housing-location process at
many different points. The model searches for a "solution"—a
situation in which no one can improve his position according to the
rules of behavior and constraints he obeys—through a matching of
households with new or existing dwellings. In the nontechnical
description of the model in this section, we take up each of the four
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then introduce a price-quantity diagram illustrating the interaction of
households, owners, and builders.
"Model" Households. Each "model" household represents several
hundred or thousand actual households, the exact number depending
on the size of the metropolitan area to which the model is being
applied. A household belongs to one of several household types and
is characterized by two measures of its income. The household types
with which we have worked in applying the model to specific
metropolitan areas include white, nonelderly families; white, elderly,
single-person households; black, nonelderlyfamilies; and black,
elderly, single-person households; in the case of Austin, the types
also include Chicano, nonelderly families, and Chicano, elderly,
single-person households. Some of the parameters of the model, as
we shall indicate in the next section, differ by household type.
The two income measures for each model household are an actual
income figure—the estimated mean actual income of the households
represented by the model—and a "model" income figure—a weighted
average of actual income and median income for the household type
to which it belongs. Although we initially experimented with one
"permanent" income figure for each model household, we finally
decided that two income figures were necessary. An actual income
figure was necessary because certain of the programs the model is
intended to analyze—for example, housing allowances—operate on
actual income rather than any transformed version of income. The
assumption of unitary income elasticity embedded in the utility
function of the model, however, is inappropriate to measured
single-year incomes; a second, smoothed version of income was
required.' The model thus uses actual income as the variable directly
affected by certain housing, tax, or transfer programs, and model
income in actually determining the choice of location and quality
which each household makes. A change in actual income—owing to a
housing allowance, for example-is of course translated into a change
in model income, but the latter change is smaller than the former.
Household behavior in the model consists of deciding which of all
possible dwellings to occupy, including a new dwelling with any
desired level of services (subject to any government-imposed mini-
mum standards for new construction) or any of the existing dwell-
ings in the model. The household makes its decision on the basis of
the quantity of housing services offered by each dwelling, the price
per unit of the housing service offered, the household's model
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Thethree zonal characteristics are average travel time to and from
work, average net rent per dwelling, and the proportion of residents
in the zone who belong to the same racial group as the household
making the choice. Travel time is simply introduced into the model
as a piece of exogenous information about each zone. Average net
rent and racial composition are determined by the model itself, with
the result that there is a two-way interaction between household
choice and the zonal characteristics. This interaction, incidentally, is
the source of considerable complexity in the solution process for the
model, sinceitintroduces the possibility of multiple solutions
meeting the criterion of utility maximization by each household.
All the variables influencing household choices are combined into
a utility function which the household is attempting to maximize.
The function has four parameters whose values decisively influence
what the model predicts about the effects of housing policies. One of
the principal goals of the application of the model to specific
metropolitan areas is to obtain estimates of these parameters.
"Model" Dwellings. Each model dwelling, like each model house-
hold, represents several hundred or thousand actual cases; in fact, the
number of actual cases per model unit is (apart from minor statistical
adjustments) the same for dwellings as it is for households. Each
model dwelling belongs to one of several zones (five or six so far)
differing in accessibility, initial wealth, or initial racial composition.
Each model dwelling is also characterized by the quantity of housing.
services supplied—a flow of output per month—at the beginning of
the ten-year interval to which the model applies. The quantity of
housing services of a dwelling, one of the basic concepts of the
model, refers to an index of all the things of value which a physical
structure provides—space, shelter, privacy, pleasing design, and a host
of others.It does not refer to the .neighborhood characteristics
associated with each dwelling; these are measured by the
adwelling is located.
The behavior of the owners of existing dwellings consists of
making price-quantity offers with the goal of maximizing expected
profits. Each price-quantity offer consists of a quantity of housing
services to be provided at the end of the decade to which the model
refers and a price at which that quantity will be provided. The offers
thus resemble rental advertisements specifying services provided and
monthly cost. The price-quantity offers for each dwelling must lie
along a supply curve whose position depends on the initial quantity
of housing services offered by the dwelling and two parameters of
the model, one related to a depreciation rate and the other to an236 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
elasticityof supply with respect to price. It is these two parameters
which determine the supply elasticity of the existing housing stock.
The owner of each existing dwelling seeks to locate as high up
along his supply curve as he can, for his expected profits are an
increasing function of his position along the supply curve. Competi-
tion among the owners of actual dwellings making up each "model"
dwelling is assumed sufficient to keep landlords from making offers
above their supply curves.
The model includes a minimum price per unit of service, defined
as that price which is just sufficient to cover the cost of operating a
dwelling. If the ownera dwelling is unable to find an occupant at
any price at or above the minimum, then he withdraws his dwelling
from the stock of housing. Withdrawal can take the form of
long-term vacancy, demolition, conversion to nonresidential use, or
abandonment. The model does not distinguish among these different
kinds of withdrawal.
Builders. The third actor in the model, the building industry,
plays a more passive role than model households and model dwell.
ings. The industry is characterized by a horizontal supply curve, that
is, it is prepared to offer new dwellings at a monthly total cost which
is proportional to the level of services the dwelling provides. The
price per unit of service at which new dwellings are available is taken
as exogenous for each housing market. Empirically, it is measured on
the basis of FHA data on the cost and square footage of new
dwellings; it tends to set a ceiling for the price structure of all the
existing stock, although existing dwellings with especially favorable
zonal characteristics can command prices above the new-construction
price. In the present model, newly constructed dwellings are assumed
to be concentrated in a single "zone of new construction."2
For a time span much shorter than ten years the assumption of a
perfectly elastic supply of new housing would be inappropriate. The
mortgage market and building supply industries are subject to
capacity limitations which sometimes strongly influence the course
of new construction in the shortrun. Even over a ten-year span, the
supply of land is limited and the effect is to make the supply of new
housing less than perfectly elastic. Muth (1968) has argued con-
vincingly, however, that the increase in land prices due to the bidding
away of land from other users by residential users has only a neglible
effect on the long-run supply of new housing.
Governments. The final factor of the model, "government," can
influence the housing-location process at so many different points
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that it is impossible to describe its behavior succinctly. Tax charges,
subsidy payments, transfer payments with or without earmarking for
housing, minimum new-construction requirements, and the specifica.
tion of minimum quantities of housing services in a particular zone
are among the ways through which governments can affect housing
markets in the model.
An income tax can be represented by replacing a household's
actual income by income less the tax (and making a smaller
reduction in its model income) before it enters the housing market.
Tax rates and other parameters of tax formulas—for example,
exemption levels—can be set separately for each household type, or
even for each model household. Transfer payments are represented
by using the same procedure as for taxes. A transfer earmarked for
housing—a housing allowance—can be represented by requiring an
eligible household to consume at least some minimum level of
housing services or spend some minimum amount on housing in
order to receive the transfer; the household then determines its
utility-maximizing choice without the allowance, its choice with the
allowance (including the minimum requirements), and the larger of
these two maxima. A restrictive zoning ordinance can be represented
by setting a minimum quantity of housing services for all of the
dwellings in a zone. The model is exceptionally rich in the variety of
government policies it can analyze.
The Solution Process. The solution of the model, as mentioned
earlier,is a situation in which none of the four actors has any
incentive to change its position. Each household isthe unique
occupant of one dwelling, the one which maximizes its satisfaction
given all the price-quantity offers facing it. The owner of each
existing dwelling is as high up along his supply curve as he can be
without finding his dwelling vacant. (If a dwelling is vacant even at
the lowest point on its supply curve, it is withdrawn from the stock.)
The building industry is supplying the number of new dwellings
households are willing to purchase. Government regulations are
strictly enforced.
The computer program to solve the model searches for a solution
with these properties through a process of trial and error. Departures
from solution conditions in one trial govern the way in which the
solution is modified for the next trial. The steps in the search process
have no theoretical or empirical significance; itis only the final
solution of a problem which is of interest. Although the solution
algorithm is a time-consuming and complex computer program with
a number of still unresolved difficulties, it works well for the great
majority of problems we have been interested in solving.238 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
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Themodel deals with both the quality
(or level of housing services) of dwellings and with location. Figure
7-]. illustrates the treatment of quality but not the locational aspects
of the model.
The horizontal axis in Figure 7-1 measures the quantity of housing
services (a weighted index of all the separate services) provided per
month by an individual dwelling. The vertical axis measures price per
unit of service, that is, the monthly gross cost of occupancy of a
dwelling divided by its index of housing services. The total cost of a
dwelling on a monthly basis is its price times its quantity.
The diagram represents supply conditions in an urban housing
market during a ten-year interval. In a very short period—say, a
month or a year—the supply of housing services is virtually deter-
mined by the stock inherited from the previous period, and the
supply provided by an individual dwelling could be represented on
the diagram by a vertical line. In a very long period—say, half a
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Analyzing Housing Policies 239
supplypossibilities could be represented by a single, close-to-horizon-
talcurve representing the price per unit of newly constructed
dwellings, along which builders can supply any desired number of
new dwellings. In an intermediate period, the representation of
supply must reflect both the inelastic character of the existing stock
and the elastic conditions of new supply.
Linein Figure 7-1 depicts the price per unit at which new
dwellings are available. It is the sum of capital costs per month
(including land costs), operating costs per month, and developers'
normal profits, all per unit of service. Any number of new dwellings
can be built along the line, each one represented by a dot corre-
sponding to its quantity of services.
Lines SA,SB, anddepict the relation between quantity and
price for three existing dwellings, a "luxury" dwelling (C) providing a
high level of services, a "slum" dwelling (A) providing a low level of
services, and a dwelling (B) providing a level of services between the
other two. The slope and position of the three supply curves depend
on the time span to which they refer—ten years in Figure 7-1. Each
dwelling produced along the new supply line acquires its own supply
curve for the decade following initial construction. When the model
is run for two or more decades, then the position of each dwelling's
supply curve shifts from decade to decade as its start-of-decade level
of services changes.
Line P0 depicts the minimum price per unit of service at which it
pays the owner of a dwelling to keep it in operation. P0 corresponds
to the concept of average variable costs in the theory of the firm. In
the model, if an occupant cannot be found for a dwelling at a price
at or above P0, the dwelling is dropped from the housing stock.
Finally,represents an indifference curve for one household. The
point of tangency (Q1)betweenand the new-construction price
(Pa) represents the level of housing services that maximizes that
• household's utility at price -Ifthat household, in other words, is
forced to occupy a new dwelling, but at any level of services it
wishes, it will choose one with a level equal to Q1.Curvedepicts
• all other price-quantity combinations that are just as attractive to the
household as the one at point Q1.Theprecise shape ofwill not be
derived here; itissufficient to ,note that in order to persuade
household 1 to depart in either direction from its optimum choice
it is necessary to offer it a price reduction below Faced
with any offer involving a price at or abovethe household would
preferQ1
The area insiderepresents price-quantity ëombinations pre-
ferred over a new dwelling; the area outsiderepresents outcomesModeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
less satisfying than a new dwelling at Q1.Amongthe three existing
dwellings depicted in Figure 7-1, only B has any chance of being
preferred to a new dwelling by household 1. Dwelling B will be
preferred to a new dwelling at Q1ifit makes a price-quantity offer
inside Dwellings A and C would not be preferred to a new
dwelling at any price above the minimum P0. If a housing market
consisted solely of household 1, dwellings A, B, and C, and a building
industry, then the market outcome would be, according to the
model, occupancy of dwelling B at a price just below the intersection
of SB andwithdrawal of dwellings A and C from the market, and
no new construction.
As we add households and dwellings to Figure 7-1, households
have an increasing number of closely substitutable existing dwellings
from which to choose, and dwellings have a wider range of potential
occupants. Instead of one or two isolated price-quantity points at
which housing services are sold, a relatively smooth set of points
forming a price-structure curve tends to emerge. These price-struc-
ture curves are a useful device for understanding the operation of the
model and will be described at the beginning of the section on
simulation results.
MathematicalSpecification
Twokinds of behavior drive the model: utility maximization by
households and profit maximization by owners of existing dwellings.
The household utilityfunction and the landlord-owner supply
functions used in the empirical work are specified below.3
Household Utility Functions. Each household evaluates each
dwelling by means of a utility function. The utility of dwelling jto
household 1, can be represented as
=HXZ1Z2 Z3




where Q1isthe quantity of housing services offered by dwelling j,a1
is a parameter expressing the strength of housing preferences (versus
preference for other goods) for households of typei, isa
parameter expressing the degree to which households will alter their
housing choice in response to a price discount, is household i's
model income after adjustment for taxes and transfers, andis the
price per unit of service of newly constructed dwellings.
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Theterm in the utility function described by Equation (7-2) is an
• elaboration of the idea underlying the so-called linear expenditure
system, namely, that observed demand behavior is best approximated
by making utility depend on the excess of quantities consumed over
some minimum acceptable levels. Unlike the linear expenditure
system, however, Equation (7-2) makes the minimum acceptable
level itself a function of income. The importance of the minimum
depends on the parameter 'y,whichis determined empirically. For
equalto zero, Equation reduces to a simple Cobb-Douglas
expression for the utility of housing services.
X represents the utility of nonhousing goods and is specified in a
manner analogous to H. The budget constraint facing the consumer is
used to define nonhousing goods as (Yr —Q1),where is the
household's model income and P. and arethe price and quantity
of services of dwellingj.4 X is defined as
X= (7-3)
Three zonal characteristics are represented by the Z's: accessibility
(Z1), wealth (Z2), and racial composition (Z3) and are defined in
Equations (7-4), (7-5), and (7-6).
=(200— + (74)
where T1 is average travel time (in hours per month) in the zone in
which dwelling jislocated,is a parameter expressing the strength
of housing preferences of households of the type of household i, and
is the value offor white, nonelderly families.
The term in parentheses, 200 —T.,is an approximation to
monthly hours of leisure time available to an average worker in the
zone in which dwelling jislocated. The exponent of this term is
based on the value households place on travel time and on analysis of




whererepresents price per unit of housing services; P0, minimum
operating costs per unit of housing services; Q1,quantityof housing
services; andis a parameter expressing the strength of preferences
for a wealthy zone. P and Qreferto zonal averages (the zone in
which dwellingj is located); andP' and Q',toSMSA averages. Hence,
the expression represents the average net rent (gross rent less
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operatingcosts) of dwellings in a zone relative to the average net rent Pittsburgh,
in an SMSA, and serves as an indicator of zonal wealth. a wide range of
Finally, housing costs. E
gathering ande
Z3 = +[1,0001(10073+1)] (7-6) of results.
The firstma
whereis the proportion of households located in the same zone specify zonal
as dwelling jandbelonging to the same racial group as household i, households. Ea
and 'Yqisa parameter expressing the strength of household prefer- basis of 1960 d
encesracial homogeneity. The largerthe more sensitive is racial compositi
(and hence to variations in Re.. Withequal to zero, Z3can that boundaries
vary only between 1,000 andi,oof,a range of 0.1 percent. With 73 Thus, in most
equal to 1.0, Z3canvary between approximately 10 and 11, a range minority zone,
of 10 percent. suburban zones
Next, a hedor
Supply Functions for Existing Dwellings. The supply curve for rent deflatorf
existing dwellingj is specified as follows: distribution of
distribution of
1 / 2\/ P1—P0\1 serviceswas the
= 1P+ )
(7-7) 1,200 actual d'
L F'c J providingthe h
obtain one mac
where Q1isthe level of housing services currently provided by highest level of
dwelling j;Q0, thelevel of housing services provided by dwelling j dwellingof Zon
ten years ago; P1, the price per unit of service offered by dwelling); an analogous wa
operating costs per unit of service; and Pt,, capital costs per unit household types
of service for a new dwelling.andare empirically determined nonelderly famil:
parameters. Prices are all on adowbasis, that is, they are costs per Econometric
unit of service per month, not costs per unit of capital stock. used to obtain
Equation (7-7) is derived from the maximization of an expression expressing the st
for expected profits, subject to a production function for housing for each of
services. The production function is given by: household
r 1a
althoughnot
— + (C\ holdsof a given t
— I I I I 'I Toestimate
L 0,J simulatedunder
where C is the quantity of capital invested in a dwelling during a and values were
decade. The properties of this function and the derivation of the distributions
supply curve are discussed in de Leeuw and Struyk (1976). from the initial
proceeded in
EmpiricalResults . 1960dwellings
The model has been applied to six metropolitan areas for the supply in order
decade of 1960-1970. The areas are Austin, Chicago, Durham, function. Then,
1960.1970, to obAnalyzing Housing Policies 243
Pittsburgh,Portland (Oregon), and Washington, D.C. They represent
a wide range of sizes, growth rates, racial compositions, incomes, and
housing costs. Each application involved several man-months of data
gathering and estimation. Space permits only the briefest summary
of results.
The first major step in applying the model to an area was to
specify zonal boundaries and to construct model dwellings and
households. Each area was divided into four or five zones on the
basis of 1960 data so as to maximize within-zone homogeneity in
racial composition and rental values but subject to the constraint
that boundaries of major political jurisdictions had to be retained.
Thus, in most areas, there was an inner-city, low-income, high-
minority zone, a "rest of the central city" zone, and two or three
suburban zones separated on the basisincome.
Next, a hedonic index technique was used to construct a value and.
rent deflator for each zone. Each deflator was applied to the
distributionof housing values and rentsin order to obtain a
distribution of housing services for each zone. This distribution of
services was then subdivided into model dwellings. In an area with
1,200 actual dwellings per model dwelling, the 1,200 dwellings
providing the lowest level of services in Zone 1 were averaged to
obtain one model dwelling for Zone 2, the 1,200 with the next
highest level of services were averaged to obtain a second model
dwelling of Zone 1, and so forth. Model households were obtained in
an analogous way from separate income distributions for each of the
household types of the model (white, nonelderly families, black,
nonelderly families, and so forth).
Econometric analysis of rent-income and value-income ratios was
used to obtain one set of key parameters of the model, the aiphas
expressing the strength of preference for housing versus other goods
for each of the household types of the model. Analysis of the
household utility function shows that the alphas are closely related,
although not identical to, the proportion of income which house-
holds of a given type devote to housing.
To estimate the other behavioral parameters, the model was
simulated under a variety of assumptions about these parameters,
and values were selected that gave the best fit to actual zonal
distributions of incomes, racial composition, rent, and withdrawals
from the initial stock of housing. This estimation by simulation
proceeded in two steps. First, 1960 households were matched with
1960 dwellings under the assumption of a perfectly inelastic 1960
supply in order to obtain the best-fitting gammas of the utility
function. Then, using those gammas, the model was simulated for
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Theresults of this lengthy and complex estimating procedure are
summarized in Table 7-1. For most of the parameters there are clear
central tendencies in the estimates. For example, the values of alpha
for white, nonelderly families cluster around 0.8, while those for
elderly, white families cluster around 0.25. For the parameters of the
supply function (the i3's), however, the distribution appears to be
bimodal. For three of the cities, a2isestimated at 0.9, andranges
from 0.4 to 0.6; for two others, a2isestimated at only 0.4, and a1,
at0.7. A number of empirical and sensitivity tests we have con-
ducted lead us to conclude that (a) we cannot at present reduce this
range of uncertainty about the supply function parameters and
(b) some of the policy simulation results depend on which end of the
range of estimates we use. Consequently, we have used two different
pairs of beta estimates, an "elastic" set and an "inelastic" one, in
most of our policy analyses. Even the elastic set, however, implies a
price elasticity of supply in the neighborhood of 1.0, or far below
the supply elasticity of new dwellings. N
SIMULATION RESULTS
Cl)
Inthis section we analyze the effects on the housing stock and
household location of four economic or demographic changes: an
increase in the cost of new construction, an especially topical subject
in light of the experience of the past few years; a decrease in the rate
of growth of urban areas, another subject suggested by recent U.S.
trends; a housing allowance program with a payment formula that
makes 22 percent of the population eligible; and a subsidy payment
for the construction of new units, a housing strategy pursued to
some extent in this country and especially interesting in comparison
with housing allowances. Before reporting the results of these
analyses, we introduce the concept of a "price-structure curve," >
whichoffers a way of obtaining an intuitive grasp of the effects of
housing policies and other developments on various sectors of the
housing market.
TheStructure of Housing Prices
Oneway of thinking about the model is as a set of demand and
supply functions for closely related submarkets. There is a demand
for, and supply of, low-quality model dwellings in the inner city;
high-quality dwellings in the inner city; and so on for many levels of
housing services and many geographic locations and for new dwell-
ings as well as existing dwellings. The prices per unit of housing





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4246 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
submarkets they represent—need not be the same, because one model
dwelling is not a perfect substitute (in either demand or supply) for
another. Prices of various model dwellings cannot differ too much,
however, because substitution in demand is strong enough to cause
vacancies or overoccupancy if the price of one dwelling is out of line
with prices of closely related dwellings.
A price-structure curve provides a useful way to summarize
housing market results in the model. Figure 7-2 illustrates two
price-structure curves based on actual runs of the model; the
quantity of housing services produced by each dwelling is measured
along the horizontal axis; and the price per unit of housing service
for each of these dwellings, along the vertical axis. The total monthly
amount the occupant pays for housing servicesisthe quantity
multiplied by the price per unit of service. Each point on the curves
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represents one model dwelling and can be thought of broadly as
representing the intersection of a demand curve and a supply curve
for one submarket.
Generally, prices per unit of service tend to lie between lines
and P0 on the price axis. As in Figure 7-1,is the price per unit at
which new dwellings are available, and P0 represents minimum costs
per unit of service necessary to keep a dwelling in operation. If a unit
remains vacant even after its price has been lowered to P0, then the
dwelling (according to the model) wiil be withdrawn from the
occupied residential stock through conversion to nonresidential use,
prolonged vacancy, or abandonment.
tends to serve as an upper limit to housing prices because a
household is very unlikely to pay more per unit of service for an
existing dwelling than for a new dwelling with an identical level of
services. One important exception to this ceiling role ofoccurs
because in most metropolitan areas, building codes, zoning require-
ments, and other regulations effectively prevent construction of new
dwellings with a low level of services. For example, large parts of
most metropolitan areas exclude or carefully regulate mobile homes.
Below the minimum permitted level of new-housing services, repre-
sented by in Figure 7-2, there is no reason why prices per unit of
service cannot exceed P—as in fact they do in the bottom panel of
the figure.
Dynamic forces within most housing markets tend to keep prices
close to the ceiling for moderate- and high-service dwellings.
These dynamic forces include growth in real income over time,
growth in population over time, and depreciation of dwellings over
time. All three forces tend to create excess demand for housing at
the high-service end of the range, with the result that prices of
existing dwellings in that range tend to be driven up toward the
ceiling and that is the range within which new construction usually
takes place.
In the low-service end of the range the three forces do not act in
the same direction. At that end, growth in real income and depreci-
ation of the housing stock probably tend to create an excess supply
of dwellings and, hence, lower prices. On the other hand, population
growth, especially in the form of an influx of low-income house-
holds, tends to increase the demand for services. Where the excess-
supply forces dominate, the result may be a situation like case 1 in
Figure 7-2, in which low-service dwellings sell at a discount per unit
of service. Where population growth is rapid and where there is an
effective minimum near the low-service end of the scale, the
result may be the curve depicted for case 2 in Figure 7-2, in which
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housingfairlynear the low-service end of the scale sells at a
premium.
Besides the other reason prices may exceed isthe
desirability of certain locations. Since household choices depend in
part on characteristics of the zone in which a dwelling is located, a
zone with especially desirable characteristics can command a premi-
um above new-construction prices. Variations in zone characteristics
account for much of the departure from smoothness in the two
price-structure curves of Figure 7-2.
The device of a price-structure curve will prove useful in under-
standing simulations of a variety of market developments and
housing policies. We shall introduce each of the four developments to
be analyzed below with a discussion of how we would expect that
development to change price-structure curves for different kinds of
initial housing market situations. While these discussions fall far short
of rigorous analyses, they provide valuable intuitive guidance to the
way major housing market forces interact in the model.
Before we present actual model results, we again indicate what the
policy simulations do and do not represent. The simulations trace
through both the direct effects on households or dwellings of a
subsidy or a higher new-dwelling price, and those indirect effects on
other households or dwellings that are due to the interrelations of
different sectors of the housing market. In the case of housing
policies, the simulations take account of both subsidies and any taxes
levied to finance them. The simulations stop short, however, of a full
general equilibrium model of all interrelations in the economy; they
deal only with interrelations of demands and supplies within an
urban housing market. The simulations are also limited, with the
exception of a few references to twenty-year runs, to ten-year
changes; there are no suggestions as to the monthly or annual path
that housing prices, services, or locational patterns might follow in
moving from start- to end-of-decade positions. In the case of housing
policies, finally, results refer to "idealized" policies in which program
provisions are fully known and obeyed by each participant.
ARise in the Cost of New Construction
Inthe short run, the greatest impact of a rise in new-construction
costs would appear to be on those with a high probability of
occupying new dwellings—generally speaking, on affluent rather than
poor households, on young rather than old households, on white
rather than black households. However, ten-year impacts taking full
account of interrelationships among housing submarkets can be, as
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thereforea good example of the value of the model in improving our
understanding of housing markets.
For an understanding of model simulation results, the price-struc-
ture curves just described are a useful starting point. A rise in new
construction costs is equivalent to a rise in linein Figure 7-2. In
the middle and upper ranges of housing quality, whereserves as
an effective upper limit to the prices of existing dwellings, we would
expect the latter to rise by approximately the same amount as the
rise in new-construction costs. At these higher prices, however,
households will presumably choose to consume smaller amounts of
housing services. This downward shift in demand can have two
effects. One, which we shall not observe in the simulation and which
would in general require a large price increase, is that prices of some
high-quality dwellings could fall below theceiling. The second
effect, very much in evidence in the simulations, is that this shift will
increase the demand for low- and moderate-quality dwellings and,
hence, raise their prices. Thus, even in ranges whereis not an
effective upper limit to the price structure, an increase in can
cause a rise in prices.
The increase in demand for low- and moderate-quality housing can
cause not only an increase in prices, but an increase in housing
"conservation" as well—that is, some dwellings that would otherwise
be withdrawn from the stock remain occupied. In a housing market
in which very few dwellings are being withdrawn from stock even
without high construction costs, this conservation effect is neces-
sarily limited. In fact, in a tight market of this kind it can even
happen that higher construction costs cause some low-income house-
holds to be left literally without housing; the existing dwellings they
would have occupied at a lower price structure are demanded by
households that can outbid them, while the cost of a minimum-
standard new dwelling is higher than they can afford. In less
extreme market situations, however, an increase in new-construction
costs can cause a significant drop in withdrawals from the stock and
result in correspondingly fewer new dwellings.
These results of higher new-construction costs are sketched in the
top panel of Figure 7-3, which refers to one of the two actual cases
to be analyzed below. Prices of existing dwellings in the upper
quality ranges rise by almost exactly the amount of the increase in
and prices of low-quality dwellings rise by somewhat more than
the increase in Careful examination of the figure reveals that one
additional existing model dwelling withdrawn from the stock in the
low-Pa case is retained and occupied in the high-Pa case.
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eachdesigned to be representative of a fairly large group of U.S.
metropolitan areas in the 1960s. Urban Area A is characterized by a
high rate of growth, a relatively high proportion of minority
households, and a relatively elastic supply of existing dwellings.
UrbanArea B is also characterized by a high rate of growth but has a
• low minority proportion and an inelastic supply of existing dwell-
• ings. While these areas are just two of the eight sets of initial market
conditions we used in our work, they are sufficient to give an
nstructiofl accurateimpression of our simulation results. dwellings
nstruction price Resultsfor prices and quantities generally follow the pattern
gswithhigher
: suggested by the discussion of price-structure curves. Prices for
jOflprice high-incomehouseholds (roughly, those with incomes above the
-construc'°'
median)are close to theceiling and rise by almost exactly the
1 5-cent increase in Prices for moderate- and low-income house-
200 holdsfor whom theceiling is not necessarily effective also rise,
but by slightly less than 5 cents in some cases and slightly more in
others. Quantities consumed generally fall, and the implied rise in
• elasticity of demand relating the fall in quantity to the rise in price is
generally close to —1.0, the value which is built into the household
—-,-— utilityfunctions.
The one exception to this quantity response shows up on Urban
Area A for low-income households and for the inner-city zone. For
• these (heavily overlapping) categories, quantities are unchanged or
higher in spite of higher prices. The clue to these exceptions lies in
the next block of figures in the table, summarizing new construction
and withdrawals. In Urban Area A there are no withdrawals from
ction price stockeven in the "standard" case, and so there is no possibility of
respondingto higher prices by conserving dwellings which would be
dropped out of the stock in the standard case. In effect, the
w-constructiOn increasingdemand for moderate- and low-quality dwellings encoun-
ters a completely inelastic supply in terms of numbers of dwellings.
The supply in terms of dwelling quality is not completely inelastic,
.4 however, with the result that the increase in demand permits some
200 landlordsto move up along their supply curves and offer bigger
quantities at higher prices. The large price increase in the central city
of Urban Area A reflects this movement along supply curves. In
Urban Area B, where there are withdrawals from stock in the
• standard case, the supply of low-quality dwellings is not completely
inelastic, and low-income households, by increasing the conservation
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Thezonal average prices in the table indicate that the Urban existing dwellii
Institute housing model—at least the version we use in this study— structure ofexi
does not necessarily yield a price gradient in which inner-city housing low- andmodei
prices are higher than housing prices in less accessible portions of have verymuch
urban areas. The relation in the model between inner-city prices and Since thereare
prices elsewhere depends on three sets of zonal characteristics: thereforeexpec
accessibility, average dwelling quality, and racial composition. Acces- dwellings, pushj
sibility makes for higher inner-citypricesin our model asin causing some
theoretical models or urban structures generally; but the other two Possibility ofw:
attributes can work in either direction (as the discussion of Figure holds neednot
7-2 illustrated in the case of dwelling quality). In the results shown in rather, theycan
Table 7-2 the three sets of attributes result more or less in a standoff; quality dwellings
average prices differ very little between the inner city and the rest of The results
the urban area.5 high-income hrn
The final block of figures in Table 7-2 indicates very little change slightly inone ai
in the pattern of minority household occupancy. Price-structure small differences
curves do not permit us to form any expectations about racial households. For
occupancy patterns, and it is indeed difficult to make any generaliza- holds, however,
tions about simulation results based on our model. A great deal seems combination of
to depend on whether the distribution of demand by minority group increase in withc
households closely matches the distribution of services in a particular scale in bothar
zone; the latter, in turn, is quite sensitive to minor variations in the inner city, wher
initial conditions of a problem. move down alon
the low end of ti
ADecline in the Rate of Population Growth quantityof
The high rates of growth that characterize the two urban areas of higher new-coi
analyzed in this study enter the model in the form of a high number households are sr
of "model" households in the final year of the decade relative to the
number of "model" dwellings existing in the initial year. It is easy to A Housing Alic
simulate lower rates of growth in population by reducing the number The proposal
of "model" households—from 40 to 33 for Urban Area A and from was the impetus
43 to 35 for Urban Area B. The same distributions of income by the policy is curr
household type are assumed under both sets of growth rates, with allowance simulal
the result that average income is almost the same for the rapid- tax combined wit
growth and slow-growth cases. tion as a conditi
In terms of price-structure curves, low population growth can be requirement is th
thought of as reducing demands in a wide range of submarkets. For proportion of the
middle- and upper-quality housing, whereis an effective ceiling to services.
prices of existing dwellings, the critical question about lower growth Subsidies unde
is whether it reduces demand enough to make the ceiling no longer positive) between
effective.For moderate declines in growth, such as the cases households and si
analyzed here, we would expect the model to yield simply a decline The correspondir
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existingdwellings. For drastic reductions in growth, the entire
structureexisting housing prices may begin to slip belowFor
low- and moderate-quality housing, a reduction in demand cannot
have very much of its impact in the form of fewer new dwellings,
since there are few or no new dwellings to begin with. We would
therefore expect the impact of low demand to fall on existing
dwellings, pushing down their prices and quantities of services and
causing some of them to be withdrawn from the stock. The
possibility of withdrawal from stock means that low-income house-
holds need not reduce the quantities they consume as prices fall;
rather, they can respond to price reductions by moving into higher-
quality dwellings and consuming the higher quantities they prefer.
The results shown in Table 7-2 bear out these expectations. For
high-income households prices hardly change, while quantities rise
slightly in one area and fall in the other, a random variation due to
small differences in the distribution of incomes among high-income
households. For moderate- and even more for low-income house-
holds, however, average prices fall and average quantities rise. The
combination of lower prices and higher quantities requires an
increase in withdrawals from stock, and this takes place on a large
scale in both areas. Geographically, it is especially evident in the
inner city, where a significant price reduction causes dwellings to
move down along their supply curves; but increased withdrawals at
the low end of the quality spectrum nevertheless permit the average
quantity of services per occupied dwelling to increase. As in the case
of higher new-construction costs, effects on the location of minority
households are small and do not provide any basis for generalization.
i
A Housing Allowance Program
Theproposal of housing allowances for low-income households
was the impetus for construction of the Urban Institute model, and
the policy is currently being tested in a number of urban areas. The
allowance simulations reported are in the form of a negative income
tax combined with a stipulated minimum level of housing consump-
tion as a condition of receiving an income subsidy. The minimum
requirement is the means of inducing households to spend a large
proportion of the subsidy on housing rather than on other goods and
services.
Subsidies under these plans are equal to the difference (when
positive) between 20 percent of gross income and $66.40 for elderly
households and single persons and $82.70 for all other family units.
The corresponding annual breakeven incomes implied by these
schedules are just under $4,000 and $5,000. A tax rate of approxi-'F—
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mately1 percent of income, after deducting exemptions, finances
the subsidy. In order to receive the subsidy, elderly households and
singles must consume at least 54 units of housing services, and all
other eligible households must consume at least 65 units. These
requirements approximately equal the levels of service which the
"guarantee" subsidy levels ($66.40 and $82.70) would buy at the
new-construction price per unit of service ($1.24).
In terms of price-structure curves, housing allowances reduce
demand for the very poorest quality of housing, increase demand for
quantities just above the minimum requirements, and slightly reduce
demand (because of the tax) for high-quality housing. The effect on
the poorest-quality housing ought to be a decline in price and, hence,
an increase in withdrawals, with the final result that very few
households may end up actually paying the lower prices.
For housing just above the minimum, results ought to depend
critically on the initial price-structure curve. If there is an
discount for this type of housing, then a housing allowance can cause
a significant price increase before households will be induced to
move into new dwellings. If there is no initial discount, the price
effects could well be much more moderate. The bottom panel of
Figure 7-3 depicts the first of these cases, in which a housing
allowance causes significant price increases for quantities above the
required minimum. For high-quality housing, an allowance program
ought to reduce quantities consumed slightly and affect prices very
little.
As Table 7-3 indicates, the results of high-income households in
the two urban areas show the expected slight decline in quantities
and stability in prices. Moderate-income households also experience
little change in quantities and prices. For low-income households,
however, there is a sharp contrast between the two areas, illustrating
the two cases just discussed. In Urban Area A, where the supply of
existing dwellings is relatively elastic and there is initially very little
discount for low-quality housing, a housing allowance causes only a
minor increase in prices,, and most of the subsidy paid goes into
higher quantities of housing services purchased by the recipients. In
Urban Area B, on the other hand, where there is a substantial
discount for low-quality housing in the standard case, an allowance
causes sharp price increases for recipients in the housing allowance
case. Here, about half of the increased expenditure on housing goes
into higher prices, with only the remaining half going into consump-
tion of higher quantities of services.
The figures in the table relating to moderate-income households
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thequestions about housing allowances has been whether they would
drive up prices facing households with income just above the
eligibility limits. In the cases analyzed in the table, as well as in other
cases we have analyzed, the answer is no: price effects of housing
allowances are very largely confined to the income range from which
eligible households are drawn.
The contrast between the two areas carried over into inner-city
changes in housing stock developments. In Area A, with little initial
price discount, allowances cause a significant shift out of the
poorest-quality housing, with the result that average quantity prices
for dwellings in the inner city rise and withdrawals increase
sharply. In Area B, while some existing model dwellings are up-
graded, and their prices approach the new-construction price, the
price of one dwelling with quantity far below the program minimum
is reduced enough to tempt a low-income household to refuse the
allowance and occupy an extremely low-rent dwelling. Average prices
in the inner city consequently fall in Area B, and only one additional
dwelling is withdrawn. In neither area is there any effect on racial
composition.
In addition to the results shown in Table 7-3, we have analyzed a
variety of other housing allowance and income transfer programs for
these two cases and a number of others. Our conclusions based on
this work include the following:
1. A full-scale housing allowance would, in many locations, signifi-
cantly increase housing prices by participants.
2. The inflationary danger of a housing allowance varies with back-
ground circumstances. It is most severe where prices per unit of
housing service initially are especially low relative to new.construc-
tion costs—where low-quality housing, in other words, is relatively
cheap. The danger is least where prices initially are above new-
• construction costs.
3. Point 2 notwithstanding, the allowance is most cost-effective in
areas with an initial price discount for lower-quality units because
existing dwellings there, even after moving up their supply curves,
are cheaper than dwellings providing equivalent quantities of
services in no-discount areas.
• 4. Income redistribution without any earmarking for housing would
drive up housing prices but by significantly less than allowances.
• 5. Most of the upward price movement due to a housing allowance
affects participants directly. Households above eligibility levels
suffer only minor price increases.
6. Price effects of a housing allowance are much greater over a
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Thislast point is particularly worth emphasizing.6 The structure Like housing
of the model implies that the price effects of housing policies should withdrawals
become less severe as time passes. The reason is basically that the withdrawn from
longer the time span the more elastic the supply of housing. A price declines inpric
that causes the services from an existing dwelling to decline by 10 generally lead t
percent in one decade will cause services to decline by approximately Table 7-3 ilusti
20 percent in two decades; conversely, a price causing a rise in Contrast inquan
services by 10 percent in one decade will cause a rise of about 20 construction bet
percent in two decades. Furthermore, the longer the time span under The
consideration, the larger generally will be the share accounted for by way of summaj
new construction, the supply of which is assumed to be perfectly different groups
elastic. Our simulation results suggest that ten years is too short a Possible to calcu
period in which to attain the highly elastic respohse to housing or negative) eqw
subsidies we would eventually expect, but twenty years' time households disti]
suffices. taxes and traris:
equivalents"are
ANew-Construction Subsidy pluses. In somei
Thepolicy of a supply subsidy to all newly constructed dwellings Pu
corresponds to what is often called the "filtering" strategy of equivalents
encouraging high levels of new-housing starts with the expectation do not.
that these will eventually benefit occupants of existing housing There are serio
through a chain of moves. "cash equivalent'
The specific policy is one which lowers the price of new dwellings alone a group
from $1.24 to $1.15 per unit of housing service. The subsidy is households of dif
financed out of general income taxes; the tax rate is identical to the Presenting the res
one used to finance the full-scale housing allowance just discussed. the Same as those
This identity of tax rates and hence of program costs facilitates are those eligible
comparison between the two policies, with incomes bet
In terms of price structure we would expect a new-construction income, all other
subsidy to have effects in many respects just opposite to those of an Two principal
increase in new-housing costs. In the portion of the price-structure The first, hardly
curve where the new-construction price is the effective ceiling, prices benefit to
of existing dwellings should decline by roughly the amount of the two groups of ho
subsidy. At these lower prices the demand for relatively good quality the first column,
housing should shift upward (the tax to finance the subsidy will $26 increase in a
moderate but not eliminate this shift), with a corresponding down- hold, while a new
ward shift in the demand for low-quality dwellings. The downward per month. For t
shift should in turn cause prices of low-quality dwellings to fall and ance is the equiva
withdrawals to increase, construction subsi
In our two urban areas, as Table 7-3 shows, the decline in prices to-high income ho
facing high-income households closely matches the depth of the in average.
subsidy, while the price decrease for low-income households is nearly (—$10) than for th
twice as large. Low-income households are thus major, if indirect, The second, ai
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Likehousing allowances, construction subsidies lead to increasing
withdrawals from the housing stock. For those existing dwellings not
withdrawn from the stock, however, construction subsidies lead to
declines in prices and services provided, while housing allowances
generally lead to increases in both factors. The zonal averages in
• Table 7-3 illustrate the contrast in prices, although they mask the
contrast in quantities because of differences in withdrawals and new
construction between the two policies.
The household utility function underlying the model provides a
way of summarizing costs and benefits of the two programs to
different groups of the population. Using the utility function, it is
possible to calculate an average change in monthly income (positive
or negative) equivalent to each policy for each of the three groups of
households distinguished in Table 7-3, taking account not only of
taxes and transfers but of market effects as well. These "cash
equivalents" are in simple cases closely related to consumer sur-
pluses. In some more complex cases, as when minimum participation
requirements push households off their demand curves, the cash
• equivalents remain operative, whereas measures of consumer surplus
• do not.
There are serious conceptual problems in any such calculation of a
"cash equivalent" of a given policy even for a single household, let
alone a group of households. Nevertheless, the comparison among
households of differing incomes seems interesting enough to warrant
presenting the results shown in Table 7-4. The income definitions are
the same as those used in Table 7-3; households labeled low income
are those eligible for the housing allowance; moderate income, those
with incomes between 100 and 150 percent of eligibility; and high
income, all other households.
Two principal conclusions are suggested by the data in Table 7-4.
The first, hardly a surprise, is that housing allowances are of more
benefit to low-income households and of greater cost to the other
two groups of households than new-construction subsidies. Thus, in
the first column, a housing allowance policy is the equivalent of a
$26 increase in monthly income for the average low-income house-
hold, while a new-construction subsidy is the equivalent of only $5
per month. For the average moderate-income household, the allow-
ance is the equivalent of a $2 decrease in monthly income, while the
construction subsidy is the equivalent of a $5 increase. For middle-
to-high income households both policies are equivalent to decreases
in average income, with a greater decrease for the allowance plan
(—$10) than for the new-construction subsidy (—$3).
The second, and perhaps unexpected, conclusion is that both
policies in effect redistribute income from high-income to low-
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Full-scale allowance —10 —4
New-construction subsidy —3 -4
Note: The "cash equivalent" figures in this table are derived from individual household
utility levels before and after the introduction of each policy, which is carried out in three
steps. The first step is the translation of utility changes for each household into income or
cash equivalent changes. In this step prices and certain other market variables are held
constant at an average of their no-policy and policy levels. The second step is the averaging
of cash equivalent changes over groups of households. The third step is the correction of the
group averages in step 2 so that their average over all households for any one city and policy
equals zero. The correction is accomplished by adjusting each group average cash equivalent
by the same fraction of group average income. Essentially, this correction is a way of
distributing the increased profits on existing dwellings in the case of a housing allowance
and the reduced profits on existing dwellings in the case of a new-construction subsidy. The
distribution of profits in both cases is assumed to be proportional to group average income.
While this assumption is plausible, it has not been tested, nor is the restriction that cash
equivalents average to zero the result of any empirical or theoretical work.
income households. That a housing allowance works out that way is
not of course surprising, but that a new-construction subsidy should
have that effect is something of a surprise. The reason for the result
isthe close substitution in demand between new and existing
dwellings. Although the direct price subsidy goes only to occupants
of new dwellings—and their incomes are well above the average—the
indirect price effects of the subsidy extend the benefits to low-
income households. Taxes to finance the subsidy are paid by
high-income and "near-eligible" households, and not by low-income
households.
Some caveats are in order with respect to this final result, A
different tax structure could of course substantially alter the progres-
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tabletake detailed account of market changes as they affect housing
consumption, they deal only crudely, as the note to the table
indicates, with the feedback of market changes to income via changes
in landlord and homeowner profits. Nevertheless, the comparisons in
the table are of some value in themselves and perhaps even more
valuable as an indication of the potential of the model in comparing
costs and benefits of a wide range of housing programs to different
groups of households.
THER ELIABILITY OF RESULTS
Theaim of the Urban Institute housing model has been to quantify
the broad interrelations among sectors of a metropolitan housing
market. Without such quantification there is invariably a great deal
of uncertainty about the effects of housing and land-use policies,
including housing allowances, construction subsidies, restrictive zon-
ing, and urban renewal. But while quantification is highly desirable, a
detailed tracing of all linkages, short run and long, among the many
neighborhoods and structural types of a large metropolitan area
would be an enormously complex and expensive undertaking. The
model has therefore focused on "broad" interrelations, restricting.
itself to five or six geographic zones, a single quantitative index of
physical housing services for each of a few dozen model dwellings,
and a small number of parameters expressing the behavior of
households and owners.
There are two ways of looking at the model that may be helpful in
judging how well it meets our objective. The first is a brief listing of
itsprincipal strengths and weaknesses. The second isa capsule
summary of its essential structural features—an attempt to answer
the question, What ingredients of a model are necessary to obtain
policy results like the ones in this study?
On the strengths and limitations of the model, three strong points
deserve special emphasis. First, the model is grounded in a well-
developed theory of housing market behavior. Because of its rela-
tively tight theoretical framework, the model is rich in the range of
empirical information that can be related to it and of exogenous
developments or behavioral changes it can analyze. Further, model
solutions, while obtained through a fairly complex and not always
automatic algorithm, can be understood and analyzed quite easily
through graphic devices such as new-housing indifference curves and
price-structure curves.
The second point has to do with validation. The model has been
fitted to six metropolitan areas displaying a wide variety of housing264 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
conditionsand has produced a distinct clustering of most of the
major estimated parameters. The results for all six areas as a group
have been analyzed for the sensitivity of the errors of fit to slight
changes in the parameters. Only for the parameters measuring the
supply behavior of the existing stock does the range of uncertainty
remain large enough to have important policy implications. For the
six areas to which it has been applied, the model is a distinct
improvement over a simpler model in which housing depreciates at a
fixed rate and neighborhood effects are ignored. In addition, the
model has performed respectably when used to predict 1970 market
outcomes for one area on the basis of parametric values obtained by
applying the model to other areas. On balance, the present model has
received much more extensive empirical testing than other existing
urban models.
The third strong point is that the model is capable of analyzing a
broad range of detailed policy changes. Many of the qualitative
policy implications derived from the model hold up under a range of
initial conditions, but the variation is often systematic and the results
suggest broad generalizations about the effects of housing policies in
different markets. The model should generate many ideas about the
consequences of housing policies and the design of optimal policies,
especially if the range of uncertainty about supply behavior is
narrowed.
Regarding limitations, four points deserve some emphasis. First,
the model is restricted to ten-year intervals and in fact in work so far,
to the single ten-year interval 1960-1970. Much public concern over
the market effects of housing policies relates to periods shorter than
ten years; but the model conveys no information about the annual or
monthly path from the initial position to its ten-year results. Much
could be done by way of applications to urban areas outside the
United States, time spans other than a decade, and historical periods
other than the 1960s.
A second limitation is that the model is too aggregative to serve as
a reliable predictor of the detailed consequences of policy changes or
exogenous developments for particular zones or household group-
ings. For example, because the number of model dwellings and
households means is small, only restricted confidence can be placed
in the spatial shifts of minorities associated with the introduction of
housing subsidy policies. Policy implications by broad groupings—
high-quality versus low-quality housing, central city versus suburb, or
rich versus poor households—are probably the finest level of detail
for which serious attention to model results is warranted.
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ofthe model, arising from its restricted range of behavior. On the
household side, behavior consists of choosing between housing and
other goods and among various housing submarkets. The possible
effects of housing allowances and other housing policies on work
incentives or family formation are ignored. Furthermore, it does not
deal with noncompliance with policy regulations or with "noneco-
nomic" influences on household responses—for example, psychologi-
cal reasons that might lead a household to decline participation in an
allowance program even if it stands to gain economically by enroll-
ing.
• On the business side, the model is restricted to markets for new
• and existing housing. There is no treatment of the basic determinants
of land costs, although an extension of the basic model does contain
implications about the effects of housing programs on relative land
costs in different portions of a metropolitan area, given the overall
average cost of land for new construction. Nor is there any treatment
of markets for other inputs into housing services, such as main-
tenance, labor, or construction materials, or of the feedback of
market changes to the distribution of household incomes.
We conclude with a list of "essential features of the model" which,
taken together, imply a theory of urban housing markets with
implications resembling, at least qualitatively, the simulation results
• presented in this paper. Of the seven features listed below, some are
bases for classifying or disaggregating the housing stock, some are
historical characteristics of metropolitan areas, and some are empiri-
cal values of key parameters. The seven features are these:
I
1. Market segmentation—the segmentation of a metropolitan housing
market into submarkets defined by location and quantity of
services.
2. Imperfect substitution—the empirical finding that these sub-
markets are close but not perfect substitutes in demand, the
imperfection being due both to strong preferences regarding
quality level and to strong neighborhood effects.
3. Durability—the separation of housing supply into new and existing
supply, with the latter accounting for most of the supply even in a
ten-year span.
4. Elastic new supply—the assumption, based on past empirical work,
that the supply of new housing is extremely elastic in a period as
long as ten years.
5. Inelastic existing supply—the empirical finding that the supply of
housing services produced from existing dwellings is far from
perfectly elastic over a ten-year span.266 Modeling the HousingMarket and Selected Housing Policies
6. Supply trends—theempirical finding that at stable (over time)
relative prices, existing dwellings change their level of services very
slowly.
7. Demand trends—the historical fact of growth ofreal income per
household over time in almost every metropolitan area (but great
variation among areas in growth of population).
The presence of market segmentation makes it possible for prices
to differ in various sectors of the market and for policies to have
heavier impacts on some submarkets than on others. Differential
prices, however, also require the presence of imperfect substitutabil-
ity in demand and inelastic supply of at least some portion of the
stock. Without these additional conditions, responses to price signals
by households and suppliers would work to eliminate price varia-
tions. Thus, the next four characteristics are all also necessary
conditions for differential policy impact in different segments of the
market.
The last two factors are responsible for the normal excess demand
for high-quality units, which is met by new construction, and the
more variable outcome at the low end of the quality spectrum, with
price discounts under some conditions but not under others. These
determinants of price structure in turn govern the differences among
submarkets and among metropolitan areas in the impact of housing
policies. Judgments about the reliability of the policy results in this
study (at least as to the direction and general magnitude) should
depend on how well these seven features of the model are thought to
constitute an accurate characterization of urban housing markets.
Our own judgment is that the estimates are the best currently
available and that they are reliable enough to merit serious considera-
tion in discussions of housing policies, at least as to direction and
general magnitude. We are aware, of course, of the value of more
testing and research. But we feel that further exploration of the
"space" of policies, city types, and parametric estimates should be
encouraged along with developmental work. Even the present model,
we feel, can be exploited to suggest a great deal about the possible
consequences of alternative housing subsidy forms; land-use policies,
mixed policy strategies, least-cost ways of achieving policy goals, and
a number of other matters that go well beyond the results in this
study.
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muchtoo short for measuring the effect of income on housing demand, strongly
supported by these two studies, is by now generally accepted even though
controversy about other aspects of housing demand continues.
2. Ann Schnare has developed a version of themodel in which the assumption
of a single zone of new construction is dropped and new dwellings are allocated
geographically.
3. A detailed justification of functional forms chosen and an analysis of their
mathematical properties will be found in de Leeuw and Struyk (1976).
4. In an expanded version of the model developed by Ann Schnare (but not
used here) money costs of transportation as well as housing expenditures are
deducted from model income.
5. The standoff, however, is apparently sensitive to our simplifying assump-
tion that all new dwellings are located in a single, relatively inaccessible "zone of
new construction." In a version of the model developed by Ann Schnare in
which this assumption is dropped, there is a muchmore pronounced tendency
toward above-average prices in the central city.
6. To simulate the model for two decades, model dwellings occupied at the
end of the first decade become the existing stock for the second decade. Model
households for the second decade are derived by extrapolating growth rates in
population and average income.
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269Comments on Chapter Seven
Edwin S. Mills
Thisis an important study. The Urban Institute housing
model isas imaginative, elaborate, careful, and sophis-
ticated as any extant urban model. This study reports on
use of the model for some painstaking analysis of government
housing policies and of changes in other exogenous variables in the
model. The policy analysis is as carefully done as any I have seen
with an urban model, and is much more carefully done than most
policy analysis in any substantive specialty in economics.
No one interested in the housing problems of the poor can fail
to be instructed by the simulations of the effects of housing
allowances and construction subsidies. They shed light on those
issues that have been important in the debate about government
housing policy: the extent to which a subsidy for construction of
new houses might improve low-income housing by the filtering
down process; the extent to which housing allowances might result
in more expensive rather than better housing for recipients; and
the effect of housing allowances on housing costs of those not
eligible for the allowances.
But suppose I ask myself how this study affects my views about
government housing policies, or how it might have affected my
views if the numbers had been different but still consistent with
the underlying model. I want to defend the conclusion that it is
unlikely that these simulations will tell us anything that will affect
our views about housing policies.
The most fundamental question that can be asked about gov-
• emment housing programs is: Why have them? More specifically,
269I
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supposethe decision has been made to redistribute income by program. This j
taxingthe nonpoor and using the money to benefit the poor. Why electorate, but
do it through housing programs rather than by a negative income is likely to bring
tax or some other cash grant? There is nothing here that would In COflClUSiOfl
justify use of housing programs to redistribute income. The reason that they don
for redistribution via housing programs is presumably the existence important matte
of an external economy or neighborhood effect from housing
consumption. But no such externality is mentioned. That is to say,
if we calculate the sum of gains and losses in consumer surplus
from the housing allowance (or the construction subsidy) and the
taxes to pay for them, the sum must be negative. In this model,
housing subsidies either create or widen gaps between prices and
costs whose equality is necessary for efficient allocation of housing
resources. Whether one ought to favor housing programs or cash
grants to redistribute income depends on the existence or nonexis-
tence of market failure in housing, not on details about how elastic
housing supplyisto low-income people. Yet the paper con-
centrates entirely on the latter kind of issue and says nothing
about the former.
Next, suppose that it has been decided, on grounds not dis-
cussed in the study, to redistribute income by housing programs.
How might the simulations affect my views as to the choice
between a housing allowance and a construction subsidy. It seems
to me that simple economic common sensetellsus that the
housing allowance is to be preferred. A construction subsidy bene-
fits the poor only indirectly in that new housing in the model (and
in reality, except for public housing) is constructed only for the
nonpoor and the poor benefit by acceleration of the filtering down
process. The housing allowance, however, goes directly to the poor.
Only if the housing allowance is badly designed, for example, by
forcing the poor to consume much more housing than they want,
could a construction subsidy benefit them more than a subsidy
provided to them directly. Any model that suggested otherwise
would be suspect. In fact, this one does not. Table 7-4 shows that,
dollar for dollar, the poor benefit more from the housing al-
lowance than from 'the construction subsidy. It is hard to imagine
a simulation that would change my belief that the poor will
benefit more from a dollar spent on a housing allowance than from
a dollar spent subsidizing new construction.
Of course, the numbers are nevertheless interesting. Even though
the poor benefit less from a construction subsidy than from an
equally costly housing allowance, the nonpoor are likely to prefer
the construction subsidy since they receive some benefit from theAnalyzing Housing Policies 271
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